Several works have indicated the relationship between polynomially solvable combinatorial optimization problems and the core non-emptiness of cooperative games associated with them, and between intractable combinatorial optimization problems and the hardness to decide the core non-emptiness of the associated games. In this paper, we study the core of a traveling salesman game, which is associated with the traveling salesman problem. First, we show that in general the problem of testing the core non-emptiness of a given traveling salesman game is NP-hard. This corresponds to the NP-hardness of the traveling salesman problem. Secondly, we show that the core of a traveling salesman game is non-empty if the distance matrix is a symmetric Monge matrix, and also that a traveling salesman game is submodular (or concave) if the distance matrix is a Kalmanson matrix. These correspond to the fact that the Monge property and the Kalmanson property are polynomially solvable special cases of the traveling salesman problem.
Introduction

Background | combinatorial optimization games
Several works have indicated the relationship between polynomially solvable combinatorial optimization problems and the core non-emptiness of cooperative games associated with them. Even the rst example in the history of combinatorial optimization games, due to Shapley{Shubik 55] , dealt with this framework. They introduced the assignment games 55], which are derived from the assignment problem (or the maximum weighted matching problem on bipartite graphs) and showed that the core of an assignment game is always nonempty. Corresponding to this, the assignment problem can be solved in polynomial time. The rst polynomial time algorithm is due to Kuhn 38] (which is called the Hungarian method) and other algorithms can be found in a textbook of combinatorial optimization (like Korte{Vygen 36] ). Another early example is a minimum cost spanning tree game by Claus{Kleitman 7] , which is based on the minimum cost spanning tree problem. Bird 3] showed that every minimum cost spanning tree game has a non-empty core, by constructing an explicit vector belonging to the core. As well as the assignment problem, the minimum cost spanning tree problem can be solved in polynomial time by the algorithms, for example, by Bor uska 45], Kruskal 37] and Prim 53] . (A textbook of combinatorial optimization like Korte{Vygen 36] provides a further account.)
In the proof of the core non-emptiness of an assignment game by Shapley{Shubik 55] , it is a key thing that the linear programming relaxation of the ordinary integer programming formulation of the assignment problem always has an integral optimal solution. In fact, the core of an assignment game is characterized as the set of optimal solutions of the dual of the linear programming relaxation. Extending this result, Deng{Ibaraki{Nagamochi 12] gave a necessary and su cient condition for maximumpacking games and minimumcovering games to have non-empty cores. It says that the linear programming relaxation of a maximum packing problem (and a minimum covering problem) has an integral optimal solution if and only if the associated game has a non-empty core, and if so the core is characterized by the set of optimal solutions of the dual of the linear programming relaxation. It gives rise to good characterizations for the core non-emptiness of some combinatorial optimization games such as maximummatching games, minimumvertex cover games, maximumindependent set games, etc. Similar results based on linear programming duality were shown by Faigle{Kern 15] on partition games and by Goemans{Skutella 23] on facility location games. (Note that a facility location game studied by Goemans{Skutella 23] is di erent from a location game of Tamir 60] and of Curiel 8] .) Moreover, Granot{Hamers{Tijs 25] investigated the core non-emptiness of delivery games in relation with the structures of the underlying graphs. In the books by Bilbao 2] and by Curiel 8] , we can nd a lot of results and properties of cooperative games associated with combinatorial optimization problems.
On the other hand, some papers have indicated the relationship between intractable combinatorial optimization problems and the hardness of testing the core non-emptiness of cooperative games associated with them. For example, Deng{Ibaraki{Nagamochi 12] showed that testing the core non-emptiness of a minimum coloring game is NP-complete; Matsui 42] showed that testing the core non-emptiness of a bin packing game is NPcomplete; Goemans{Skutella 23] showed that testing the core non-emptiness of a facility location game is NP-complete. Notice that Deng{Ibaraki{Nagamochi 12] showed that for a minimum vertex cover game and a maximum independent set game, we can test the core non-emptiness in polynomial time, while a minimum vertex cover problem and a maximum independent set problem are known to be NP-hard. Therefore, it is not always the case that, for a class of cooperative games arising from an NP-hard optimization problem, testing the core non-emptiness is hard. Note that Deng{Papadimitriou 13] also discussed cooperative games from the computational (or algorithmic) point of view.
Traveling salesman games
In this paper, we will study traveling salesman games, introduced by Potters{Curiel{Tijs 52] from the viewpoint of Section 1.1. There are some works which discuss traveling salesman games. Tamir 59] showed that a metric traveling salesman game with at most four players always has a non-empty core, and that there exists a metric traveling salesman game with six players such that the core is empty. Kuipers 39] showed that a metric traveling salesman game with ve players always has a non-empty core. Also, Potters{Curiel{Tijs 52] gave an example of an asymmetric traveling game with four players which has an empty core, and provided some conditions for an asymmetric traveling salesman game to have a non-empty core. In other papers 8, 59], we can nd other conditions for a traveling salesman game to have a non-empty core.
Stimulated by a sort of the vehicle routing problems, Herer 27] initiated to study the underlying graph structure which always yields submodular traveling salesman games. Such graphs are called naturally submodular. (The more precise de nition will be given in Section 6.5.5.) Herer{Penn 28] characterized undirected graphs which are naturally submodular, and Granot{Granot{Zhu 24] characterized directed graphs and bidirected graphs which are naturally submodular. In fact, submodularity, which is also called concavity, is an important concept in cooperative game theory. First of all, submodularity implies core non-emptiness 56]. In addition, submodularity has other good properties: for example, the Shapley value is the barycenter of the core 56]; the core is a unique von Neumann{Morgenstern solution 56]; the bargaining set coincides with the core and the kernel coincides with the nucleolus 41]; the -value is calculated in polynomial time 61]; the nucleolus is calculated in polynomial time 40] (a generalized version is also available 17]). Besides, submodularity plays an important role in the elds of network ows and combinatorial optimization. Fujishige 20] provides a survey of submodular-type optimization problems, and Murota 44] gives a further account on this topic.
Contributions of this paper
In this paper, we will show that in general the problem of testing the core non-emptiness of a given traveling salesman game is NP-hard. This corresponds to the NP-hardness of the traveling salesman problem. Also, we will provide some conditions for a symmetric traveling salesman game to have a non-empty core, which are related to polynomially solvable cases of the traveling salesman problems. First we will show that the core of a traveling salesman game is always non-empty if the distance matrix is a symmetric Monge matrix. It is known that if the distance matrix is an (asymmetric) Monge matrix then the traveling salesman problem can be solved in linear time in the number of cities 49] 
Organization
This paper is organized as follows. The next section is devoted to some de nitions and basic properties, and our results are described again in a more formal manner. In Sections 3{5, we will provide the proofs of our results. Concluding remarks are provided in the nal section. 
where (i) denotes the successor of i. We denote the k-th successor and the k-th predecessor of i 2 N 0 in the tour by the k (i) and ?k (i) respectively. A tour is sometimes denoted as = h0; (0); 2 (0); : : : ; n (0)i.
Let N = N 0 n f0g = f1; Fishburn{Pollak 19] . A professor has visited, starting from his home institute 0, the universities 1; 2; : : : ; n which invited him and after the visits he has returned to his home. The total cost of the trip should be paid by the inviting universities. The problem is to nd a \fair" rule for the allocation of the total cost among these universities. Stimulated by this example, we sometimes say that the city 0 2 N 0 which is not a player is the home. In cooperative game theory, a core is frequently used as a fair allocation rule. 
where we use a convention as x(S) = X i2S
x i] (and x(;) = 0) for a vector x 2 R N . See the chapters 35, 50] for some properties of the core of cooperative games.
As we can see from the de nition, the core can be empty for some cases. This means that in such cases we cannot nd a fair allocation by this rule. Hence, it is important to test the core non-emptiness of a given traveling salesman game. Our rst theorem is a solution to this algorithmic problem. Here is the theorem. This theorem implies that we are unlikely to have a good characterization of the core non-emptiness of a traveling salesman game in terms of distance matrices. So we can only hope that we determine some classes of matrices which give rise to core non-emptiness. The class of the Monge matrices is one of these classes.
The It is well-known that Monge matrices are related to some polynomially solvable combinatorial optimization problems 5]. The next proposition is a basic result on Monge matrices and TSP. A tour h0; i 1 ; i 2 ; : : : ; i r ; n; j 1 ; j 2 ; : : : ; j n?r?1 i on N 0 is called a pyramidal tour if i 1 < i 2 < < i r and j 1 > j 2 > > j n?r?1 . As Fig. 1 shows, in a pyramidal tour the cities i 1 ; : : : ; i r are visited on the way from the home 0 to n in a monotone manner and the cities j 1 ; : : : ; j n?r?1 are visited on the way back from n to 0 also in a monotone manner.
Proposition 1 ( 22] ). Consider a traveling salesman problem on the cities N 0 with a distance matrix D. If D is a Monge matrix, then there exists a shortest tour which is pyramidal.
Generally, a shortest pyramidaltour can be found in O(n 2 ) by the dynamic programming technique 22]. Moreover, Park 49] showed that a shortest pyramidal tour for TSP with a Monge distance matrix can be found in O(n) time invoking the structure of a Monge matrix. Therefore, TSP with a permuted Monge distance matrix can be solved in polynomial time. 1 Furthermore, for symmetric Monge matrices, we have the following result by Supnick 58] . For this case, even the concrete \shape" of a shortest tour can be determined. See also 4]. Observe that if the distance matrix is a symmetric Monge matrix, then every subgame of a traveling salesman game also has a non-empty core. That is because every submatrix of a Monge matrix is also a Monge matrix and because of Theorem 2. In cooperative game theory, a game with the property that every subgame has a non-empty core is called totally balanced. Hence, the discussion above immediately leads to the following corollary. 1 Note that some past works like 4] say that TSP with a permuted Monge distance matrix is NP-hard. 
We also say that D has the Kalmanson Note that submodularity implies total balancedness 56]. Potters 51] shows that if the cities have a master tour, the (asymmetric) traveling salesman game has a non-empty core and that for a special subcase the game is submodular. When we concentrate on the symmetric case, we can nd that Theorem 3 is a stronger statement than the above argument by Potters 51] with help of Proposition 4.
In the subsequent sections, we will prove Theorems 1, 2 and 3. Some additional remarks will be provided in the nal section. 
Proof of Theorem 2.
Now we will give a proof of Theorem 2. In the proof, we will explicitly construct a vector belonging to the core, and this construction can be done in O(n We use this fact in order to shorten the proof.
Proof where i 1 < i 2 < < i s and i; j 2 S. Assume that i < j without loss of generality. For k 2 S, de ne Pred(k) = maxfl 2 S fhg : l < kg and Succ(k) = minfl 2 S fhg : l > kg.
We consider the following three cases. Note that every submatrix of a Kalmanson matrix is also a Kalmanson matrix. Case 1. h < i 1 .
It has three subcases.
Summary and concluding remarks
In this paper, we have considered the core of symmetric traveling salesman games. We have proved that the problem of testing the core non-emptiness of a given traveling salesman game is NP-hard. Moreover, we have proved that a traveling salesman game is totally balanced if the distance matrix is a permuted symmetric Monge matrix, and that a traveling salesman game is submodular if the distance matrix is a permuted Kalmanson matrix. Now we will add some remarks.
6.1 Non-necessity of the Monge property for the core non-emptiness
We have proved that a traveling salesman game is totally balanced if the distance matrix is a Monge matrix. However, we do not know whether the Monge property is also necessary. If it is not necessary, what is the necessary and su cient condition for the traveling salesman game to be totally balanced? Note that the Monge property is not necessary for the core non-emptiness of traveling 
Similarly, a symmetric matrix D is a van der Veen matrix if for any i < j < j + 1 < l We can see that D is symmetric and satis es the conditions (6) and (7). So D is a symmetric Demidenko matrix and also a van der Veen matrix. We now show that D implies coreemptiness. Suppose that the core is non-empty, that is, we have a payo x 2 R 
Open problems
Here, we will state some open problems related to the work in this paper.
The asymmetric Monge property
In this paper, we have proved that a traveling salesman game with the symmetric Monge property has a non-empty core. So a natural question is about the asymmetric case. We did not know that a traveling salesman game with the asymmetric Monge property has a non-empty core or not.
Characterizations of totally balanced and submodular traveling salesman games
Another open problem is to characterize totally balanced traveling salesman games or submodular traveling salesman games in terms of distance matrices. It is possible that the decision problems like \is a given traveling salesman game totally balanced?" or \is a given traveling salesman game submodular?" is intractable, which implies that the good characterizations are beyond reach. For a Steiner tree game (which is also called a minimum cost spanning network game) introduced by Megiddo 43] , Fang{Cai{Deng 18] proved that deciding the total balancedness of a given Steiner tree game is NP-hard. This is the only known result on hardness of deciding the total balancedness of a class of combinatorial optimization games. Furthermore, as far as the author knows, there is no hardness result on deciding the submodularity (or the supermodularity i.e. the convexity) of a class of combinatorial optimization games. Note that the supermodularity of assignment games is characterized by Solymosi{Raghavan 57] , and the submodularity of minimum coloring games and minimum vertex cover games is characterized by Okamoto 47] .
Testing membership in the core
Faigle{Kern{Fekete{Hochst atller 16] studied the complexity of testing membership in the core of minimumcost spanning tree games and showed that this problem is coNP-complete. Also, Fang{Cai{Deng 18] showed that testing membership in the core of Steiner tree games with non-empty cores is coNP-hard. For us, how about testing membership in the core of traveling salesman games? Even in the general case we do not know the complexity. To be precise, we will state what is the problem exactly. 6.5.4 Core non-emptiness for the metric case
As Theorem 1, we proved that deciding the core non-emptiness of a given traveling salesman game is NP-hard. However, the reduction in the proof was not adapted to the metric case (in which the distance matrix satis es the triangle inequality) or the planar case. It is very plausible that the metric case and the planar case are also NP-hard. So, we will describe that as a conjecture.
Conjecture 1. The problem of testing the core non-emptiness of a given metric traveling salesman game is NP-hard. This is NP-hard even for the planar case.
6.5.5 Naturally balanced and naturally totally balanced graphs Herer 27 ], Herer{Penn 28] and Granot{Granot{Zhu 24] studied the underlying graphs structure which always yields a submodular traveling salesman game. This kind of graphs are called naturally submodular. So, it is interesting to investigate \naturally balanced" graphs or \naturally totally balanced" graphs. To state a problem precisely, we will give the de nitions. We have a graph G = (V; E) and a nonnegative weight function f : E ! R associated with each edge of the graph. Then, we construct a traveling salesman game for directed graphs and bidirected graphs. Analogously we will de ne a naturally balanced graph as a graph which yields a traveling salesman game with a non-empty core for any choice of the home v 2 V and any nonnegative function f. A naturally totally balanced graph can be de ned similarly. Now, our open problem is to characterize the naturally balanced graphs and the naturally totally balanced graphs. Note that a similar investigation was provided for delivery games by Granot{Hamers{Tijs 25] .
